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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE:




Among the many other accomplishments of Benjamin Franklin is
the creation of the first firefighting organization in Philadelphia. That it
was difficult to convince colonial Philadelphians that a group committed
to firefighting was a good idea is hard to imagine, but Franklin had to
advocate for the creation of just such a group for some time.1 In one
submission to a local newspaper, Franklin argued that prevention of a
catastrophic city-wide fire was certainly preferable to rebuilding a
2burned city from scratch. It was in this context that Franklin noted that
"an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure."3 By the close of
1736, Philadelphia had its first volunteer fire department, the Union Fire
Company.4
Although modem legal debates about the constitutionality of af-
firmative action in higher education admissions may look to the founding
fathers for guidance on the meaning of the Constitution, it is unlikely
much focus has fallen on Ben Franklin's Bucket Brigades, as the Union
Fire Company was affectionately known.5 However, it is Franklin's pre-
scient preference for prevention over cure that has the potential to lead
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law, dkiel@memphis.edu. Thanks to the staff of the Denver Law Review for putting this volume
together and to Prof. Sander and the other authors for continuing this important dialogue. Thanks
also to my research assistant, Anna Rudman Santos, who spent a fair amount of a winter vacation
working with this article and without whom it could not have been completed.
1. Fire Department: The Electric Ben Franklin, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/
franklin/philadelphia/fire.htm (last visited May 18, 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. This quote appeared in the February 4, 1735 edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette.
Writing anonymously as an "old citizen," Franklin wrote:
In the first Place, as an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure, I would advise 'em
to take care how they suffer living Coals in a full Shovel, to be carried out of one Room
into another, or up or down Stairs, unless in a Warmingpan shut; for Scraps of Fire may
fall into Chinks and make no Appearance until Midnight; when your Stairs being in
Flames, you may be forced, (as I once was) to leap out of your Windows, and hazard
your Necks to avoid being oven-roasted.
Id.
4. Citizen Ben: Firefighter, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/13 citizenfirefighter.html
(last visited May 18, 2011).
5. See generally Andrew H. Neilly, The Violent Volunteers: A History of the Volunteer Fire
Department of Philadelphia 1736-1871 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Penn-
sylvania) (on file with the Scholarly Commons Repository, University of Pennsylvania).
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the affirmative action debate from the moral, legal, and educational
quicksand in which it currently lingers.
In its current incarnation, affirmative action in higher education
admissions is the pound of cure. Indeed, the volumes dedicated to the
wisdom or legality of affirmative action or the many details of its imple-
mentation-this volume included-would weigh hundreds of pounds.
Within that conversation is hardly an ounce of discussion of prevention.
This is in part a result of the Supreme Court's consistent rejection of
remedial justifications for affirmative action. However, the omission of
prevention causes the ultimate goals of affirmative action to be obscured
and leads to an unnecessarily confrontational debate on means to attain
those goals. This Article seeks to re-insert the concept of prevention into
the affirmative action discussion.
Challenging the underlying premise that higher education admis-
sions (cure) can be considered independently of underlying educational
disparities (prevention), this Article criticizes affirmative action in higher
education admissions-along with the bulk of the debate concerning it-
as focusing too much energy on treating the symptoms that result from
educational disparities along racial, socioeconomic, and other demo-
graphic lines and too little attention on the disparities themselves. Pre-
vention or minimization of those disparities offers an opportunity to shift
the affirmative action conversation away from the divisive arguments
about the use of race and toward the goal of leveling the playing field so
that race need not be used. This Article then offers some actions univer-
sities, and law schools in particular, can take to participate in broadening
the concept of what affirmative action can mean.
This Article, however, recognizes that universities and law schools
can only play a limited role in directly addressing the larger educational
and societal disparities that make affirmative action necessary to achieve
diverse student bodies. Further, the Article recognizes that even a pana-
cean solution to the underlying disparities would take a generation or
more to impact higher education applicant pools. Thus, although intro-
ducing prevention into the debate, this Article goes on to discuss the cur-
rent cure. Specifically, this Article considers the arguments offered by
Professor Sander regarding socioeconomic diversity in legal education,
agreeing with much, but cautioning against discarding entirely the use of
race in the admissions process. Although the current use of race is imper-
fect and merits significant modification, removing race from the process
erroneously pretends that race, independent of socioeconomic status,
does not affect an applicant's credentials when data indicates otherwise.
Fire prevention is undoubtedly a more efficient way of limiting fire
damage than putting fires out after they have begun. For many minority
and low socioeconomic students applying to college and law school, the
fires of disparate educational opportunities have been burning their entire
lives. Fighting these fires with preferences in the admissions process is
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inefficient and probably ineffective at addressing the underlying educa-
tional disparities-it occurs well after much of the damage has been
done. Putting the fires out earlier in life-or, ideally, preventing them
entirely-should be an explicit goal of any affirmative action policy.
Losing sight of this ultimate goal and limiting the debate to the narrow
means of higher education admissions policies puts any affirmative ac-
tion program at risk of legal, moral, and educational failure.
I. PREVENTION
In narrowly upholding the University of Michigan Law School's
consideration of race in making admissions decisions in order to achieve
student body diversity, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in 2003 that, "We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today."6 Implicit in the Court's statement is the
assumption that something significant will have changed to make the
objective qualifications' of the applicant pool for law school admissions
less racially disparate by 2028. Indeed, Justice O'Connor looked to the
increases in application credentials of minority applicants in the quarter
century following Regents of the University of California v. Bakke8 in
forecasting similar gains following Grutter v. Bollinger.9 Those increases
between 1978 and 2003, of course, had little to do with the use of race at
the university or graduate school admissions stage-making higher edu-
cation more accessible for minority applicants impacts which students
are admitted, not how students are schooled in the decades leading up to
admission.
Thus, the twenty-five year sunset provision for the use of race in
admissions decisions presumes that something wholly outside of the ad-
missions process will render the use of race in that process unnecessary.
The affirmative action debate of today, however, remains largely limited
to the intricacies within the admissions process and does not consider the
ways in which universities and law schools can aid in proving the Court
right. After all, Justice O'Connor's projection of more racially equitable
applicant pools is not going to happen magically, just as the gains fol-
6. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
7. My use of objective criteria, such as standardized tests, in determining qualification is not
an endorsement of such use, but rather an acknowledgement of the prevalence of it. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to critique the meaning of "qualified" for higher education admissions, though
such a reimagining may do more to affect higher education admissions than any tinkering with the
current admissions process.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education.
Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed in-
creased.").
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794 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 88:4
lowing Bakke were not a result of natural evolution.10 And there is some
evidence that the post-Bakke gains have plateaued, creating an even
greater urgency to confront current disparities." Law schools and univer-
sities can be partners in the broader effort to provide equitable educa-
tional opportunities and ensure that race can indeed "no longer be neces-
sary" when today's toddlers apply to college.
A. Why Do We Have Affirmative Action in Higher Ed Admissions? And
Why Do We Need It?
Before one can engage in a meaningful discussion of affirmative ac-
tion, the purpose of the program must be defined. At its core, affirmative
action in higher education seeks to increase the accessibility of a univer-
sity or graduate education for members of underrepresented groups, most
typically members of minority groups. It was born from a recognition
that simply lifting the restrictions on minority enrollment would not re-
sult in meaningful accessibility for disadvantaged populations.12
Qualified individuals, such as Heman Sweatt13 or G.W. McLaurin,14
may attain advanced degrees, but without more-without something
affirmative-minority representation in higher education would remain
isolated, a status quo some universities were unwilling to accept.
To confront that status quo, institutions began intervening in the
admissions process to ensure greater diversity in incoming classes.' 5 Cur-
10. In the 1970s and 1980s, shrinking of the black-white disparity for 9-year-olds on the
NAEP test follows the same nonlinear trajectory as national reductions in pupil-to-teacher ratios.
RONALD F. FERGUSON, TOWARD EXCELLENCE WITH EQUITY: AN EMERGING VISION FOR CLOSING
THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 43-45 (2007). In addition civil rights gains and changes in family educa-
tional background may have played an important role in decreasing the achievement gap during that
period. See David Grissmer, Ann Flanagan & Stephanie Williamson, Why Did The Black-White Test
Score Gap Narrow in the 1970s and 1980s?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 182, 183
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998). Further, more demanding coursework that was
part of a broad-based movement for accountability in the 1980s may have had significant effects on
increasing achievement. FERGUSON, supra, at 55-5 8.
11. See NAOMI CHUDOWSKY, VICTOR CHUDOWSKY & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC.
POLICY, STATE TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2007-08, PART 3: ARE ACHIEVEMENT GAPS
CLOSING AND IS ACHIEVEMENT RISING FOR ALL? 12 (2009) (noting that while education gaps have
narrowed since the 1970s, "[e]ven with the general narrowing trend, the black-white and Latino-
white gaps on NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress] remain large"); FERGUSON,
supra note 10, at 43 (noting that all of the progress for 9-year-olds in narrowing the achievement gap
was completed by 1986 in math and 1988 for reading).
12. See, e.g., About the AAAA, AM. Ass'N FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
http://www.affirmativeaction.org/about.html (last visited May 18, 2011) (claiming that the goal of
affirmative action is to provide the country with a way "to finally address the systematic exclusion of
individuals of talent on the basis of their gender, or race from opportunities to develop, perform,
achieve and contribute").
13. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (declaring a constitutional requirement
that an African American applicant be admitted to University of Texas law school).
14. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (declar-
ing functional segregation, such as a separate seating area within a classroom, within University of
Oklahoma graduate school of education to be unconstitutional).
15. See TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 150-51 (2004). After Bakke, a number of other colleges and law schools began to formulate
2011] REFRAANG THE DEBATE ABOUT LAW SCHOOL
rently, those interventions include consideration of an applicant's demo-
graphic characteristics-including race-in evaluating credentials for
admission. It is that consideration of race that sparks much of the modem
affirmative action debate.
Although the Supreme Court has narrowed the constitutionally
compelling reasons for considering race, there are a variety of reasons
why schools might consider it in their interests to pursue diverse student
bodies. In Bakke, the admissions program at the UC-Davis Medical
School claimed to serve the purposes of "(i) [R]educing the historic defi-
cit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession; (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination;
(iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communi-
ties currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body."' 6
As is clear from the Bakke list, the program was as much, if not
more, about remedying prior and current discrimination in the world
outside of university admissions (items (i) through (iii)) as it was about
obtaining benefits within higher education (item (iv)). Bakke validated
only the final purpose-pursuing the educational benefits of diversity-
as being constitutionally valid,17 a holding affirmed in Grutter.18 In so
doing, Bakke and Grutter have excluded any discussion of remedial
goals from the legal discussion surrounding affirmative action-a result
that contributes to the exclusive focus on cure over prevention in the
legal literature.
However, the affirmative action debate is not limited to the court-
room. In the broader public debate about affirmative action in higher
education-a debate that is moral, philosophical, and political as much as
legal-the rejected purposes remain relevant. Even if these justifications
are not compelling to courts, remedial goals are undoubtedly part of what
drives the desire for diversity. The Grutter Court acknowledged as much,
noting that law schools in particular "must be inclusive of talented and
their admissions processes around the goal of student body diversity. See Victor V. Wright, Note,
Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages in Suspect Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking
Down an Affirmative Action Admissions Program, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 890 (1997). As a result,
many law schools and colleges now consider race as part of an applicant's overall profile. See
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling
Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 390 (1998).
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 311-12. Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion in Bakke, rejected the
preference for members of racial groups solely for the purposes of increasing their numbers in the
medical school as being "facially invalid." Id. at 307. In addition, he rejected the University's efforts
to remedy societal discrimination as being too broad without any specific holding of prior discrimi-
nation by the university. Id. at 307-08. Finally, Justice Powell rejected the argument that admitting
more minority applicants would lead to better medical care in minority communities because of a
failure of proof that such enhanced medical care would actually result. Id. at 311.
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
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qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions
that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in Amer-
ica."' 9 Unstated in identifying the need for prospective inclusion is the
history of exclusion of many members of various races and ethnicities
from universities and law schools, institutions which are "the training
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."2 0 Remedying that
historical wrong remains a baseline motivation for any affirmative action
policy, even if institutions cannot say so in court.
B. Prevention is a More Efficient Solution
These justifications-educational or remedial-do not indicate on
their own why it is necessary to consider demographic characteristics in
making admissions decisions to attain them. The underlying problem that
makes admissions interventions necessary to achieve diverse student
bodies is the fact that there are vast inequities in the applicant pools that
fall along demographic lines. That problem--educational disparities-
has nothing to do with law school admissions. Indeed, if that problem
were solved (i.e., prevented), then there would be no need for admissions
preferences and the purposes offered in Bakke and Grutter could be
achieved without controversy.
Of course, the problem is not solved. Universities and law schools
confront demographic disparities in objective qualifications within their
applicant pools. That reality forces institutions to make a choice: they
may either take affirmative action to enhance broader accessibility across
demographic lines or they may live with the status quo and less diverse
student bodies. Most universities and law schools choose to intervene in
the admissions process in order to ensure diversity. Typically, the inter-
ventions are significant2 1 because they come at the highest level of edu-
cation within a society where there are educational disparities nearly
every step of the way from birth to law school admission. In other words,
law schools are attempting to put out a very large fire. As a result, the
effort to achieve diversity within the student body is necessarily signifi-
cant.
19. Id. at 332-33 (describing the degree to which the nation's political leadership includes
individuals with law degrees).
20. Id. at 308.
21. As Professor Sander demonstrates using the University of Missouri at Columbia as an
example, an admissions index score between 58 and 62 led to a 35% chance of admittance for a
white student, but a guarantee of admittance for an African American student. Richard H. Sander,
Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 654-55 (2011). Professor Sander
also notes that the interventions may be the "equivalent [of] a fifteen point LSAT boost for African
Americans, and a seven or eight point LSAT boost for Hispanics." Id Similarly, the University of
Michigan law school argued that without its interventions in the admissions process, "the number of
underrepresented minority students admitted to the Law School would be significantly smaller."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 385 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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In Class in American Legal Education, Professor Sander recognizes
as much when he asks the "interesting and important question" about
whether the disparities in law school enrollment along socioeconomic
lines are caused not by law school admissions policies but by the cumu-
lative effects of disadvantages in the educational system that students
from low-socioeconomic circumstances encounter throughout their aca-
demic careers. 22 Specifically, Professor Sander asks: "[A]re the relative
odds of completing college so heavily tilted against low-SES students
that there is no meaningful pool of potential law school entrants?" 23 In
order to isolate his question about the degree to which law schools are
barring access for low-SES students, Professor Sander is forced to screen
out the socioeconomic disparities in attaining bachelor's degrees. For
example, it is certainly troubling to learn that only 5% of law students
come from the bottom SES quartile. 2 4 However, the degree to which law
schools are responsible for this is limited.25 After all, only 7.6% of
bachelor's degree holders come from the bottom SES quartile. 2 6 Compar-
ing 5% to 25% to note the degree of underrepresentation of low-SES
students in law school is ghastly; comparing 5% to 7.6% remains trou-
bling, but is far less dramatic.27
Sadly, the same screening out would be required at every step of the
educational process. Isolating the degree of disadvantage faced in college
admissions, therefore, would have to account for the fact of disparities in
high school graduation rates. Isolating the degree of disadvantage faced
in high school graduation would require accounting for the disparities in
school quality during elementary and high school. Isolating the degree of
disadvantage in school quality during elementary and high school would
require accounting for disparities in pre-school literacy. And so on.
There are fires at every stage of the educational process and they
culminate in the need for a significant intervention during the higher
education admissions process. The conversation Professor Sander's arti-
cle triggers can only shrug this phenomenon off as "interesting and im-
portant." To be fair, Professor Sander's goal is not to fix the education
system and the broader societal disparities facing students from low so-
cioeconomic circumstances, but rather to fix modem affirmative action
in law schools-which is precisely the point. Restricting the conversation
to the least efficient (and most controversial) means of addressing the
problem can provide only a superficial fix. Broadening the conversation
to include prevention helps reveal a more comprehensive solution.
22. Sander, supra note 21, at 639.
23. Id
24. Id. at 646 tbl.5.
25. 1 am not, however, suggesting that law schools are absolved from responsibility. I only
mean to point out that law schools are the final step in a process rife with disparities.
26. Sander, supra note 21, at 640.
27. Id. at 640 tbl.2.
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There are many scholars and advocates, not necessarily in the legal
field, who are working on prevention. For instance, there is data indicat-
ing that pre-school literacy can have long-term educational effects.28
There is data on the impact of teacher quality on school performance,
particularly for low-SES students. 2 9 There are programs that attempt to
create a cradle-through-college safety net that ensures that students, re-
gardless of race or socioeconomic status, have the objective credentials
to attain college admission even without admissions preferences.3 0
This is not the proper forum to summarize the significant research
being done on prevention. The goal here is to indicate that this research
represents the comprehensive fix to modem affirmative action-it is the
way modem affirmative action becomes, as Justice O'Connor predicts,
unnecessary. Excluding it from an affirmative action debate, policy, or
conversation endangers any affirmative action program from being ex-
posed, often properly, as inadequate and ineffective at achieving its
goals.
C. Including Prevention Can Increase Public Support for Equitable
Educational Opportunity
Incorporating prevention into an affirmative action policy or con-
versation not only explicitly acknowledges the root causes that make
admissions interventions necessary and the inadequacies of the current
cure, but also builds a broader coalition of supporters of equitable educa-
tional opportunities that includes even opponents to the practice of af-
firmative action in admissions. Criticisms of modem affirmative action
are typically not leveled against the goal of increasing diversity, but
rather are offered against achieving diversity by manipulating the admis-
28. CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD ET AL., NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., HOME LITERACY
ACTIVITIES AND SIGNS OF CHILDREN'S EMERGING LITERACY, 1993 AND 1999, at 2, 5 (1999), avail-
able at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/2000026.pdf (noting that there is an increasing number of fami-
lies emphasizing literacy, and that there is a strong association between family literacy and chil-
dren's emerging literacy, and also discussing the differences among ethnicities in familial literacy
emphasis); HARVARD FAMILY RESEARCH PROJECT, RESEARCH BRIEF: FAMILY INVOLVEMENT
MAKES A DIFFERENCE IN SCHOOL SUCCESS (2006), available at http://www.hfrp.org/publications-
resources/browse-our-publications/family-involvement-makes-a-difference-in-school-success (find-
ing that "[c]hildren whose parents read to them at home recognize letters of the alphabet ... sooner
than those whose parents do not; [c]hildren whose parents teach them how to write words are able to
identify letters and connect them to speech sounds; [and] [c]hildren whose mothers use complex
sentences in their everyday conversations achieve high scores on literacy-related tasks in kindergar-
ten."). On average, African American three- and four-year-olds score lower on tests of school readi-
ness than white students. Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score
Group: An Introduction, in BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 1-2 & fig.1-1 (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); see also FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 3.
29. Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: At a Glance, CENTER FOR PUB. EDUC. (Oct. 4,
2005), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/StaffingstudentsfTeacher-quality-and-
student-achievement-At-a-glance/default.aspx (citing studies finding that "[tleacher quality more
heavily influenced differences in student performance than did race, class, or school of the student").
30. See, e.g., 100 Blocks, One Bright Future, HARLEM CHILDREN'S ZONE,
http://www.hcz.org/about-us/the-hcz-project (last visited May 23, 2011); The Partnership, STRIVE
TOGETHER, http://www.strivetogether.org/about-the-partnership (last visited May 23, 2011).
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sions process. A bottom-up solution-such as prevention-that could get
to diversity in higher education without the top-down manipulation of the
admissions process would likely enjoy significant public support.31 Af-
firmative action advocates who omit at least an acknowledgement that
prevention would be a better result for everyone do so at the risk of los-
ing support not only for affirmative action in its current form but for the
broader goals in the quest for more equitable educational opportunity-
the well-supported ends get lost in the controversial means.
Restricting the concept of affirmative action to the consideration of
race in admissions puts the entire effort to achieve diversity and equita-
ble educational opportunity in a constant state of uncertainty because the
use of race in the admissions process is morally, legally, and education-
ally controversial. The controversy is only heightened when the signifi-
cance of the intervention is revealed.3 2
Moral opponents of affirmative action argue that it is unjust to treat
people differently based on race or other factors that do not relate to in-
dividual merit. 3 Legal opponents of affirmative action morph the moral
criticism into a legal argument, claiming that differential treatment based
on race is inherently suspect (even when allegedly pursued for benevo-
lent ends). 34 Legal opponents go on to argue that affirmative action poli-
cies serve no compelling government interest or are not narrowly tailored
to a compelling interest to withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny
applied to all racial classifications or to diversity.35 Finally, educational
opponents of affirmative action argue that the means employed to
31. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 96-99 (2001) (referencing four state surveys on support for educational opportunity
equality, including one Kentucky survey in which 72.6 percent of pollsters said they preferred equal
educational opportunity more than high academic achievement).
32. See Sander, supra note 21, at 654 (noting that in most cases, the impact is of being identi-
fied as an African American is the equivalent of fifteen LSAT points, and seven or eight LSAT
points for Hispanics).
33. See, e.g., Louis P. Pojman, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 12 INT'L J. FOR APPLIED
PHIL. 97 (1998) (arguing that affirmative action itself requires discrimination, encourages mediocrity
and incompetence, and fails to value merit for merit's sake); G. Stolyarov 11, Three Ethical Argu-
ments Against Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED CONTENT FROM YAHOO! (June 1, 2007),
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2643 10/three ethical arguments against affirmative.html
?cat-72 (arguing that "affirmative action harms its intended beneficiaries ... punishes the most
innocent and industrious of persons, and that it defies an essentially individualistic American work
ethic").
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, contain-
ing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.").
35. For example, Justice Thomas has repeatedly insisted that any admissions policy that
considers race is unconstitutional. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that use of programs that promote differential treatment of minorities based solely
on race should be "categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause"); see also Grutter, 539
U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas is by no means
alone in this position. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner at
21-22, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 144985.
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achieve diversity distort the educational system when they deemphasize
individual merit.36
Although these criticisms argue for doing away with modem af-
firmative action, they should not be mistaken as opposition to equitable
educational opportunity.37 An affirmative action program that more ex-
plicitly demonstrates-both in its rhetoric and its policies-that it is not
solely about admissions preferences, but also about leveling the playing
field through prevention can capture the public enthusiasm for decreas-
ing educational disparities throughout the education system. If ultimately
successful, prevention would render the moral, legal, and educational
opposition moot-there would be no more need for disparate treatment
based on demographic factors, muting the moral and legal arguments,
and the educational argument would disappear as individual merit in-
creased in importance. The current affirmative action conversation, fo-
cused solely on top-down means, misses the opportunity to engage even
current opponents of admissions preferences in crafting bottom-up solu-
tions to the underlying problem of educational disparities along demo-
graphic lines.
D. What Can Law Schools Do?
A proper criticism at this point would be that law schools are not in
the business of fixing all the problems of the world, but rather are in the
business of training law students. Taken literally and to its logical ex-
treme, an affirmative action program focused on prevention would re-
quire universities and law schools to drop everything for a couple dec-
ades and focus entirely on addressing disparities throughout the educa-
tion system. Although it may be tempting to imagine what could be ac-
complished if the whole of society committed to getting education right,
it is obviously unrealistic. So, what can law schools do?
At a minimum, law schools pursuing diversity can adjust their
rhetoric to include prevention. As discussed above, limiting the conver-
sation to the most controversial method of addressing the problem-
36. In addition to the "academic mismatch" hypothesis discussed in Professor Sander's arti-
cle, arguing that admitting minority students to schools for which they are not academically prepared
does them a great disservice, others have argued that using affirmative action creates bifurcated
student bodies. See Sander, supra note 21, at 666-67. Rather than benefit from student diversity, the
goal condoned by the Supreme Court, students begin to resent and stigmatize one another, focusing
only on potential or perceived academic differences and inferiorities. See Jeffrey B. Wolff, Com-
ment, Affirmative Action in College and Graduate School Admissions-The Effects ofHopwood and
the Actions of the U C. Board of Regents on its Continued Existence, 50 SMU L. REV. 627, 637
(1997).
37. To the contrary, some affirmative action opponents would argue that they are in fact the
purest of equitable education advocates since they advocate a system that prohibits the use of any-
thing other than merit in delivering educational opportunities. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Constitution abhors classifications
based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegiti-
mate motives, but also because every time the govemment places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.").
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intervention in the admissions process-creates an unnecessarily con-
frontational atmosphere and puts the entire undertaking at risk of being
dismissed as inadequate, ineffective, or even unconstitutional. Broaden-
ing the discussion to include prevention has the potential to make allies
(at least partial allies) out of critics in the short term and, in the long
term, to contribute to the ultimate goal of making affirmative action un-
necessary.3 8
Beyond the rhetorical shift to include prevention, law schools can
take a variety of meaningful action signaling a commitment to support
prevention efforts. Each of these suggestions could be incorporated as an
element of a school's affirmative action process to serve as a tangible
commitment to prevention.
Institutionally, universities and law schools can support research
aimed at eliminating disparities throughout the educational system.
Within a local community, law schools could signal their commitment to
prevention by engaging directly with minority and low socioeconomic
students facing educational disparities. This could include anything from
adopting a school and committing resources to directly aid students to
organizing and supporting individual students, faculty, and staff involved
in direct mentoring or tutoring.
On a more substantial level, law schools could offer loan forgive-
ness to graduates who teach or counsel students from underrepresented
demographic groups. Many law schools offer loan forgiveness for stu-
dents engaging in public service legal work; 9 broadening the criteria to
include students who commit to addressing educational disparities, either
as teachers or in other capacities would signal an institution's commit-
ment to prevention. 4 0 This seems particularly promising considering the
fact that many students may enroll in law school without quite knowing
what they would like to do with their law degree and exit with a debt
load that requires them to work as lawyers, at least in the short term. In
38. One potential negative side effect to such a rhetorical shift could be that it may undermine
an institution's claim that its policies are tailored to achieve the limited compelling interest of cap-
turing the educational benefits of diversity.
39. See, e.g., COAP (Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP)), YALE L. SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/COAP.htm#WhoCOAP Serves (last visited May 23, 2011);
Low Income Protection Plan (LIPP), HARv. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/lipp/
index.html (last visited May 23, 2011); Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP), STAN. L.
SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/tuition/assistance/#overview (last visited May 23,
2011). It is typical for these programs to require law-related employment.
40. Students who teach in public schools that primarily serve low-income students are eligible
to have portions of any federal Perkins loans forgiven. Stafford Loan Forgiveness,
STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/repayment/forgiveness.php (last visited May 23,
2011). It appears that the Yale Loan Repayment Assistance Program might consider employment as
a teacher to qualify for loan forgiveness. COAP (Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP),
supra note 39.
41. One example of this is discussed in the American Bar Association's 2003 study on loan
repayment and forgiveness. See ABA COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT & FORGIVENESS, LIFTING
THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE (2003), available at
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addition, in the current economy, students are exiting law school with
J.D.'s and without legal jobs-that talent would be welcomed to help fill
the vast national need for quality teachers.42
The possibilities are limitless, but will only be conceived if law
schools are willing to recognize the broader mission of their affirmative
action programs. By contributing not only to firefighting, but also fire
prevention, law schools can redefine what affirmative action means.
II. CURE
Benjamin Franklin was smart enough to understand that even
though prevention was more efficient than cure, cure could not be ig-
nored. The Union Fire Company and other firefighting companies like it
could prevent a citywide conflagration but would never be able to pre-
vent every fire in Philadelphia. Recognizing the limitations of preven-
tion, Franklin helped form the Philadelphia Contributorship in 1752.43
The Contributorship was the first successful fire insurance company in
the colonies, insuring Philadelphians against catastrophic financial loss
in the event of a fire.
Just as Franklin confronted fires from both front-end prevention and
back-end insurance, so too must any discussion of affirmative action in
higher education consider both ways to minimize educational disparities
confronting students in the years before they apply and ways to utilize
the admissions process to address the disparities that persist. Thus, while
this article has been critical of the exclusive focus on cure, it now enters
that discussion.
As discussed above, law schools and universities have a limited
ability to implement policies aimed at prevention. The suggestions above
will not have any impact on the diversity within law schools in the im-
mediate future; they are instead aimed at reframing the affirmative action
debate. In addition, the impact of even perfect prevention of educational
disparities would take decades to reach university and law school appli-
cant pools, suggesting that some form of cure is therefore necessary for
the foreseeable future, just as Justice O'Connor suggested. The current
cure of utilizing demographic considerations in the admissions process is
sufficiently flawed to merit reexamination.
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/lrap/lrapfinalreport.pdf. That study concluded that
because of increasingly high debt amounts for law students, as many as 66% of graduates were
dissuaded from entering any kind of public interest or government job because those types of jobs
would not allow them to pay back their loans. Id. at 10. The study further noted that even those who
did initially enter public service left after only a few years due to financial constraint. Id.
42. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at BUI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/091aw.html?src=me&ref-general.
43. Citizen Ben: Insurance Ben-EFactor, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/13
citizeninsurance.html (last visited May 23, 2011); see also NICHOLAS B. WAINWRIGHT, A
PHILADELPHIA STORY: THE PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP FOR THE INSURANCE OF HOUSES
FROM LOSS BY FIRE 28-29 (1952).
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The cure constitutionally licensed in Grutter involves the considera-
tion of an applicant's race in arriving at admissions decisions. Under
Grutter, which permits the use of race in seeking the educational benefits
of a diverse student body, "diversity" should mean more than simply
race. Although the Grutter Court suggested ways to ensure proper tailor-
ing,44 it refused to offer precise guidelines as to how race may be used.
Indeed, the Court prohibited the use of any fixed formula in the compan-
ion Gratz case.4 5 Scholars are thus left to look at the outcomes to attempt
to determine the degree to which race impacts admissions decisions.
There is no need here to rehash the litany of potential criticisms
with this behind-the-curtain system. Professor Sander has identified one
particular side effect of focusing primarily on racial group membership
in providing admissions preferences-the difficulty applicants of all
races from lower socioeconomic backgrounds have in accessing legal
education. To the extent Professor Sander's article is identifying that
problem and proving its existence with data, I applaud it. As Professor
Sander notes, "Some law school policies militate against the admission
of low- and moderate-SES applicants. Even in awarding grants and
scholarships, law schools apparently generally ignore need . .,,46 This
is morally and educationally indefensible.
I wholly support the call for a comprehensive and thoughtful re-
sponse to these circumstances, though I must reiterate that Professor
Sander's own data shows that a significant portion of these disparities is
caused by the multiple other hurdles facing low and moderate SES stu-
dents throughout their lives and not by law school admission practices. It
is attention to the pre-law school disparities that is contemplated in Part I
of this Article.
For those who support the goal of increasing socioeconomic diver-
sity in law schools, there is little to quibble with in Professor Sander's
suggestions to: (1) "eliminate or minimize the harmful effects of prac-
tices that favor high-SES applicants"; (2) "institute . . . financial aid poli-
cies tied to student need"; and (3) begin implementation of admissions
preferences based on socioeconomic status. 4 7 With regard to the admis-
sions preferences, Professor Sander suggests them as "at least a partial
substitute for current racial preferences."4 8 So long as consideration of
44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-42 (2003). Specifically, the Court instructed that
narrow tailoring requires (1) a serious and good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives prior
to adopting a race-conscious plan; (2) use of race in a flexible, non-mechanical manner; (3) no undue
burden being placed on non-minority applicants; and (4) periodic reviews of the program's contin-
ued necessity. Id.
45. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (striking down the automatic addition of a
fixed number of points to an applicant's admissions index based on status as a member of an under-
represented minority group).
46. Sander, supra note 21, at 633.
47. Id. at 660-61.
48. Id. at 664.
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socioeconomic status works in conjunction with, as opposed to supplant-
ing, consideration of race, this is a useful suggestion.4 9 Sadly, the broader
forces operating in our society-a society that very much considers race
in multiple ways-justify the continued consideration of race in higher
education admissions.
In Tables 5 and 6, Professor Sander demonstrates that law schools
are more successful in proportionately admitting African American ap-
plicants than low-SES applicants. This data proves that focusing exclu-
sively on race in allocating admissions preferences does not achieve sub-
stantial socioeconomic diversity. That phenomenon is important to know.
It is tempting, given this data, to embrace socioeconomic prefer-
ences over racial ones for all the reasons Professor Sander suggests-
they stand on firmer legal ground, they are more broadly supported,so and
they do better at allocating advantages to the most individually disadvan-
taged applicants. However, focusing exclusively on socioeconomic di-
versity may lead to the opposite result where law schools are more suc-
cessful in proportionately admitting low-SES applicants than members of
racial minority groups. In the discussion of UCLA's experiment with
socioeconomic preferences in 1997 and 1998, the resulting class may
have been racially diverse, as Professor Sander notes, but the fact that the
majority of nonwhites were Asian suggests that some racial diversity was
sacrificed."
The fact that California has been able to devise creative and effec-
tive plans in the aftermath of Prop 209 is laudable, but it does not mean
that taking racial considerations off the table is ideal for pursuing the
educational benefits of a diversity that includes racial diversity. After all,
it was the quest for racial diversity that led to the filing of briefs in the
Grutter and Gratz cases by multinational corporations and the American
military in support of the University's affirmative action policies.52
49. Although in the article for this volume Professor Sander suggests only "at least a partial
substitute," the body of his work could be read to suggest the elimination of racial preferences. See
Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 367, 482-83 (2004). As a result, I feel it is appropriate to address that suggestion.
50. For instance, socioeconomic affirmative action garners public support as high as 65%,
whereas racial affirmative action only receives approximately 26% support. Richard D. Kahlenberg,
Higher Education: Reconnecting with the American Dream, Powerpoint accompanying presentation
at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Sept. I1, 2006), available at http://www.unc.edu/
inclusion/091 1KahlenbergUNC.pdf (citing EPIC/MRA poll (conducted January 29-February 3,
2003); Los Angeles Times poll (conducted January 30-February 2, 2003); and Newsweek poll (con-
ducted January 16-17, 2003)).
51. Sander, supra note 21, at 662-63. Similarly, Professor Sander notes that African Ameri-
can and Hispanic numbers have fallen at the two most elite UC campuses in the wake of Prop 209
even as black enrollment throughout the system has increased. Id. at 655.
52. Brief of Gen. Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 399096; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading
Am. Bus. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516),
2003 WL 399056; Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in
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Achieving that racial diversity without consideration of an applicant's
race is likely to prove difficult.
In addition to this uncertainty about the impact eliminating racial
considerations would have on racial accessibility, there are further rea-
sons for maintaining considerAtion of race in the application process.
Race, independent of socioeconomic status and across the income spec-
trum, continues to impact the life trajectory of individuals. When institu-
tions are faced with choosing between two equally-qualified applicants
of identical socioeconomic status, there are credible reasons why an ap-
plicant's race should be considered. Two phenomena in particular make
this point.
First, there remain disparities in upward social mobility along racial
lines-low-income whites are more likely to ascend the income ladder
than their African American counterparts. When controlling for other
variables, whites from the lowest socioeconomic quartile are five times
as likely as African Americans from the same quartile to advance eco-
nomically. 54 Thus, it is not merely the lack of accessibility of higher edu-
cation that is holding low-income African Americans back relative to
their white peers.
In addition, there is a growing body of research suggesting signifi-
cant evaluative disparities that occur across racial lines. In one repre-
sentative study, reviewers comparing identical resumes of African
American and white job seekers rated white candidates more highly.56
Support of Respondents at 9, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL
1787554.
53. For instance, in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, after replacing racial with socioeconomic
student assignment consideration, 19.4% fewer elementary schools, 8.8% fewer middle schools, and
14.7% fewer high schools were racially integrated compared to the last year that the district was
under court-ordered race-conscious student assignment. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic
Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1556-58 (2003). In San Francisco, a consent decree in that district's
desegregation case replaced race with consideration of non-racial factors, including socioeconomic
status, in student assignment decisions. Brief of 553 Soc. Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006) (No.
05-908), 2006 WL 2927079, at *53a n.176 (citing STUART BIEGEL, ANNUAL REPORT NO. 22 OF
CONSENT DECREE MONITOR (2005) (submitted in S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78
1445 WHA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25904 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001))). The district's race-neutral
policies did not maintain racial integration. Id. at *53a.
54. See TOM HERTZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN AMERICA 4
(2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/hertz mobilityanalysis.pdf.
55. See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation ofExplicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role
of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 835
(2002) (examining the "moderating role of motivations to respond without prejudice (e.g., internal
and external) in expressions of explicit and implicit race bias"); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive
Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH:
RIGHTS AND REALITIES 377, 377-94 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (empha-
sizing studies on unintentional discrimination in selective hiring).
56. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REv. 991 (2004), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/
files/emilygreg.pdf.
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Paradoxically, this discrepancy was more significant the more qualified
the candidates were. While modestly-qualified candidates of different
races were evaluated relatively equally, higher qualified African Ameri-
can candidates were, on average, subjectively judged to be inferior to
white candidates with identical objective qualifications.s5 Students who
have reached the point of applying for law school-a point that is among
the highest reaches for education-have likely encountered such evalua-
tive bias even more than most other African Americans. These dispari-
ties, like those regarding the limitations on social mobility, exist regard-
less of socioeconomic status.
Together, these phenomena indicate that ignoring race imposes a
colorblindness in the admissions process that does not exist in society at
large, a path likely to exacerbate racial disparities in higher' education.
Professor Sander is undoubtedly correct that more attention must be paid
to leveling the playing field for applicants from low socioeconomic
backgrounds. However, because race continues to play a role in indi-
viduals' lives both before and after they reach the age for higher educa-
tion, continued consideration of race remains justifiable in order to attain
the educational benefits of diverse student bodies.
CONCLUSION
In Grutter, the Supreme Court expressed its implicit belief that the
fires of disparate educational opportunities prior to higher education will
have been put out within a quarter century. Perhaps the Court will be
right. However, there is ample evidence that the progress of the 25 years
prior to Grutter has stalled. Simply allowing the next 25 (now 18) years
to elapse without affirmatively working to reduce those disparities-and
prevent the continued need for demographic preferences in higher educa-
tion admissions-will not allow universities or law schools to continue to
achieve diversity in their student bodies. To avoid that, universities and
law schools should expand the concept of affirmative action to include
preventive measures that would make the current controversial use of
admissions preferences obsolete. Such an ounce of prevention would go
far toward maintaining attention on the best method of preventing the
fires of disparate educational opportunities from consuming another gen-
eration of American students.
57. See id. at 12.
58. See CHUDOWSKY, CIHUDOWSKY & KOBER, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that while educa-
tion gaps have narrowed since the 1970s, "[e]ven with the general narrowing trend, the black-white
and Latino-white gaps on NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress] remain large"). But
see FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that all of the progress for 9-year-olds in narrowing the
achievement gap was completed by 1986 in math and 1988 for reading).
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